On Friday March 27, 2009, President Obama outlined his new strategy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. After seven years of under-resourced, poorly focused and largely ineffective efforts, the mission in Afghanistan has been given strategic direction, and sufficient resources. Aside from the much anticipated surge of U.S. military and civilian resources, the most noteworthy change was Obama’s decision to re-focus the overall mission toward the narrower but all-important counter-terrorist goal to, ‘disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan’. Ahead of NATO’s summit this week, these brave steps are likely to widen the gap between the U.S. and Europe even more.
The war on terror revisited
Obama’s strategic shift is driven by a sober analysis of the situation in Afghanistan (and Pakistan), as well as by domestic realities. At a time when American public support for engagement in Afghanistan has been showing signs of erosion, Obama has anchored his strategy with a post-9/11 narrative that resonates strongly with his electorate. In contrast, even though Europe has been the target of several Al Qaeda attacks since 2001, the fight against terrorism has diminished in urgency. All recent opinion polls indicate that the majority of Europeans are hostile to the mission in Afghanistan and we should be hesitant about European governments’ ability to rally public opinion around the new Obama strategy.
Boots and bullets
The first pillar of Obama’s strategic re-focusing effort is the deployment this year of 17,000 additional U.S. combat troops predominantly to the south and east of Afghanistan. U.S. troops will then constitute over 50,000 of the 85,000 international troops serving. Within this figure, they will represent more than 2/3 of the international frontline fighting capacity, resulting in an americanisation of combat in Afghanistan. Whilst Canada’s troops are set for a final exist in 2010, European capitals have not sent any signal that they will proportionally match the U.S. surge. The Dutch are shifting their footprint in Uruzgan from a military to a civilian one. The French have not recovered from the trauma of the 10 French troop casualties last summer, whilst the British, who might send a few hundred more, might not be able to increase their combat engagement significantly with a weak Prime Minister and fast-shrinking popular support. The Obama administration recognizes this and has invested little political capital about extra European troops. Europe is likely to miss the troops surge rendez-vous.
Delivering ‘afghanisization’
The second pillar of Obama’s strategy is to invest in capacity-building and the strengthening of Afghan institutions necessary to deliver security and essential services to the Afghan people. 4,000 additional U.S. trainers will be sent to double the size of the Afghan national army and police forces and to mentor Afghan civil servants in national and local institutions. This pillar, if successful, represents the best possible exit scenario, and it is where Obama is likely to turn to his European allies for help. Europe has repeatedly called for resolution of the conflict through civilian efforts instead of military means, yet it has seldom delivered on this aspect. Its police training project is terminally ill : the EU has not even lined up the 400 police trainers promised this year, and is still far from reaching the overall target of the 2,300 trainers required to build a fully-functional Afghan police force. This reality calls into question Europe’s capacity to formulate coherent collective security strategies and integrate the resources required to implement them. The problem will require many more years to rectify than Obama’s 5-year calendar for his Afghanistan strategy allows.
Pakistan, the new frontline
A key element in Obama’s new Afghanistan equation is Pakistan. In addition to U.S. military aid, Obama is committing US$1.5bn per year to Pakistani civilian development. He has promised to tie this aid to clear benchmarks for progress. Statistically, the EU is Pakistan’s first trading partner, but apart from historic ties with the UK and a few specific areas of cooperation with European states, Pakistan is nowhere to be found on Europe’s strategic map. There is a clear need for the EU to reflect upon its potential for involvement with the development of Pakistan’s civilian institutions and economy, and formulate a clear strategy toward Pakistan.
Re-engagement and Resolution
Despite the generally pessimistic prospects for Europe in Afghanistan, there are some few positive signs. Europe can show its savoir-faire in election preparations and monitoring for the upcoming Afghan presidential election this August. The Obama administration seems to have re-balanced U.S. counter-narcotics approach by calling for increased interdiction of traffickers and more rural development, whilst dropping the controversial forced poppy crop eradication. Europe can certainly do more and better. But it is far from doing enough now when Afghanistan urgently requires strategic re-engagement and resolution.
