The uprisings taking place first in Tunisia and then in
Egypt have been, above all, movements of the citizens.
They are not limited to mass-rioting or a social revolt
due to the critical social and economic conditions in
which the citizens live. They are a firm demand by
desperate citizens to exercise, and as such, enjoy
the rights of their citizenship. And they are all in it
together : Muslims, Christians, Islamists, secularists,
the middle classes, students, intellectuals. For years
all the sociological surveys regularly undertaken
among the Arab public (and not the “Arab street”)
have systematically been telling us that their main
aspiration is to enjoy the rule of law. Few have paid
much attention to this substantial fact, so preoccupied
as they always are with the danger of Islamism, the
veils, preserving the status quo – hence the surprise.
This citizens’ movement has the advantage of being
a home-grown, internal, autochthonous dynamic. The
struggle for said rule of law has not been influenced
or inspired by anyone (and, of course, no-one is
“liberating” them with tanks and bombs, as in poor
Iraq). It seems that Arabs like democracy, probably to
the surprise of some. And it seems they are perfectly
ready to exercise it. They feel their citizenship and
want to be citizens. The surprise, in any case, comes
from the mistaken interpretation of identifying regimes
with countries, and paying no attention to the huge
dynamics for change and the maturing of the citizenry
in those countries embodied for years by women,
youth and a large part of civil society. No-one has
looked at society, only at the political systems.
The present rebellion is being viewed kindly because,
and it is totally true, it is led by civilians and the Islamist
parties have played no role. And that’s a good thing
because neither they nor any other political party will
be able to claim any legitimacy from being in at the
start. The legitimacy corresponds, more than ever, to
the citizenry as a whole, with all ideologies being taken
into account. But that does not mean that the Islamist
parties are not going to play a part in the transition to
democracy if things work out. In the case of Tunisia,
where Rachid Gannuchi, the charismatic leader of Al-Nahda
has just arrived, the Islamist movement is
going to gain ground with the population. In Egypt, the
most solid political opposition with grassroots support
is the Muslim Brotherhood. It has deliberately been
keeping a low profile in its actions, as will al Nahda,
which will not be putting forward any candidate for
the forthcoming presidential elections. Its members
will stand for the legislative elections. This decision
responds to an awareness that any hint of assuming
leadership and prominence by the Islamists would put
an end not only to the international empathy for the
rebellion but would also offer the trump card of the
“perils of Islamism” for it to lose the substantial external
support for these demands by citizens and shatter
their internal unity. In fact, those least interested in the
advance of that democratic evolution are those trying
to highlight in the media the risk that Egypt might fall
into the hands of Islamist radicals. But the issue raised
is that, if the dynamic for democracy wins through, the
far-from-radical Islamists of Tunisia’s al Nahda and
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt will be present in the
process, and that must not detract from the legitimacy
of and support for the all too necessary transition to
democracy. We could adapt the famous quote by
Bill Clinton to this case as “It’s democracy, stupid !”,
not the players acting in it. The obstinate attitude of
unilaterally choosing who is to take centre stage in politics
on behalf of the citizens in this part of the world
has now come to its ultimate failure.
The challenges are also different. A political rupture
of such dimensions demands a sea change in the
parameters of international politics in this region : to
stop seeing the status quo as a synonym for stability.
On the contrary, it has begotten anger, humiliation,
poverty and extremism. And to face up to the fact that
it will be possible to have good allies but not clients.
As a result, there will be great consequences in the
region.
In this sense, the case of Egypt is much more
challenging. Its symbolic and strategic weight is
decisive and without doubt many people are worried
about the fallout of a regime change. But the
nationalism that is also feeding into the rebellion is
another substantial component to take into account
to assess the strength of the mobilisation. Egyptians
know they are the benchmark for the whole region
and have taken very badly to the loss of their regional influence,
now shifted elsewhere in the Arab world, to what are
seen as excessively close relations with Israel, and
to the great intellectual and cultural weakening of this
erstwhile pioneering leader of Arab production.
For all these reasons, quelling this citizens’ rebellion
in Egypt would only be possible with a bloodbath that
the nationalist Egyptian army, the main player, cannot
afford. The prospects for a change of regime in favour
of democracy are promising, but also very complex
and filled with threats that will lurk throughout the
process.
