Première évidence : la politique étrangère n’est pas la priorité numéro un de la nouvelle administration américaine, qui concentre l’essentiel de son énergie sur la gestion de la crise économique et financière. Deuxième évidence : il est trop tôt pour juger de l’action d’un président en poste depuis le 20 janvier 2009. Les 100 premiers jours d’un président sont ceux d’un « positionnement » d’où découleront des résultats un peu plus tard. Troisième évidence : si le successeur de George W. Bush a ouvert une ère nouvelle à Washington, c’est bien plutôt en modifiant le climat des relations internationales et l’image de l’Amérique plutôt qu’en engageant de véritables ruptures de fond. Au point que William Inboden (Legatum Institute) lui reproche de vouloir appliquer à l’Amérique la règle de Saint-Benoît (« être aimé plutôt que craint ») plutôt que de celle de Machiavel (« être craint plutôt qu’aimé »).
"Atmospherics"
When it comes to atmospherics, Obama deserves a solid A. Dialogue has replaced hectoring. Realism is no longer considered a code word for appeasement (Andrew Bacevich, Boston University). Same policy, different letterhead. President Obama is looking for as much stylistic/atmospheric/rhetorical difference as he can spin, but is keeping the main elements of the Bush policy intact (Peter Feaver, Duke University). The Obama administration has improved the atmospherics of foreign policy, but only by apologizing for us and asking for nothing from others (Kori Schake, Hoover Institution).
Et pourtant, un certain nombre de décisions (ou de postures) importantes ont déjà été prises, comme en conviennent certains commentateurs de Washington. A commencer par la mise en œuvre d’un désengagement progressif de l’Irak et la montée en puissance parallèle en Afghanistan, l’annonce du désarmement nucléaire, la volonté de trouver une solution au conflit israélo-palestinien sous forme de deux Etats, une nouvelle ouverture d’esprit vis-à-vis du monde musulman, l’ouverture d’un dialogue avec l’Iran, la volonté de relancer (reset) le dialogue avec la Russie, la main tendue au Venezuela, à Cuba, à la Syrie… Mais aussi la perspective d’un nouveau traité de réduction des armements (START) avec la Russie avant la fin 2009. Ou encore l’annonce d’une réduction importante des gaz à effet de serre d’ici à 2020.
Mais sur chacun de ces sujets, les commentaires critiques sont à la hauteur des attentes.
Proche-Orient
Indeed, what we know thus far about the Obama approach to the Middle East is largely rhetorical and tactical in nature — for example, he intends to engage with Iran and Syria, and be deeply involved in the Arab-Israeli peace process. The deeper strategic questions about the new administration’s approach to the Middle East remain unanswered, however, and ultimately its strategy will depend not on words but on actions (Michael Singh, Washington Institute for Near East Policy).
Iran
The clock is ticking loudly on Iran’s nuclear weapons program, and we seem only to have added more carrots to our policy but no more apparent sticks (Christian Brose, Foreign Policy).
Russie
President Obama still lacks a Russia strategy. His opening moves essentially doing away with the Bush legacy rather than establishing an Obama line. The Russo-American detente has more or less happened already, as a function of the economic crisis and Obama resetting the U.S. foreign policy. As the going gets tougher, as it probably will, we do not know what the administration will do, whether they will still care about the relationship, or would have to let go of Russia, arguing that it was a relationship both too difficult and not critical enough (Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Moscow Center).
Chine
Barack Obama should avoid the temptations for condominium with Beijing in favor of an Asia policy that puts allies like Japan and partners like India first, as part of a broader "shaping strategy" to encourage China’s responsible rise (Dan Twining, German Marshall Fund of the United States).
Droits de l’homme
The president’s defense of his friendly chats with Hugo Chávez (Venezuela is no strategic threat to the United States) was typical : he showed no understanding or concern for the impact of his "outreach" to Chávez, or Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega, or the Chinese (one could go on) on valiant people in those countries struggling peacefully for progress toward — or back to — democracy. Meanwhile, all the key human rights posts in the administration, at State and NSC, remain vacant. If our most famous "human rights groups" were not left-leaning and in the administration’s pocket, they’d be screaming bloody murder about this scandal (Elliott Abrams, Council on Foreign Relations).
He hasn’t even closed Guantanamo yet ; he is just promising to do so in the future (Peter Feaver, Duke University).
In the long run, the advancement of U.S. interests and standing up for what is right will require friction even with allies in order to advance certain issues — for example, freedom and human rights, topics on which the new administration has been relatively quiet.
Hubris ?
Barack Obama en fait trop : c’est l’opinion qui se dégage de plusieurs commentaires. Dans le contexte d’une crise économique historique et d’un creusement des déficits non moins historiques, se dessine l’image d’un Barack Obama qui, quelles que soient ses qualités, ne pourra pas tenir toutes ses promesses.
He’s already exhibiting the classic weakness of smart, young, energetic, curious, and well-educated presidents like Bill Clinton or Jimmy Carter ; he’s interested in too many things and trying to do too much at once. He’s promising to take action on immigration, health care, and education. None of these things fits in the category of low-hanging fruit, which means they will require time, effort, and an investment of political capital. A "to-do list" this long is bound to produce more disappointments than achievements, and I don’t see anyone in the administration who is willing or able to impose a stricter set of priorities — let alone a grand strategy — on all this restless ambition (Stephen Walt, Harvard University).
