In its early years in government, the AKP had been the main driving force behind the changes required by the EU. But after 2005 it changed its stance and the reform drive lost momentum. There are at least three reasons for this rather abrupt shift. First, AKP leaders realised that the EU process would not deliver some of their key domestic goals, such as lifting the ban on headscarves in universities. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled in 2004 that the headscarf ban did not violate the European Convention on Human Rights. Although the ECHR is not an EU body, many Turks associate it with the EU and the verdict weakened EU support among the more conservative members of the ruling party. Second, AKP leaders, like many other Turks, became disillusioned with the EU because of the Cyprus dispute, perceived double standards and ambiguous messages.
Third, the AKP no longer considered the EU anchor vital for its own survival. The AKP emerged from the split of an existing Islamist party barely a year before it got elected into government and many AKP leaders had in the past been associated with political Islam. In its early years in power, the party made a particular effort to prove that it was not ‘Islamist’. One of the most effective methods was the whole-hearted embrace of the goal of EU accession. Turkey’s liberal circles and the business community, which had initially been highly sceptical of the AKP, started supporting the government because it was implementing pro-EU reforms. Once the AKP government became more confident and entrenched, these reforms slowed down.
While the government has continued paying lip-service to the goal of EU accession, the political and economic changes enacted since 2005 have been selective and timid. It has concentrated on steps designed to reduce the political role of the military, strengthen religious freedoms and increase political control over the judiciary – all steps that also enhance the AKP’s political power. However, reforms required for a broader democratisation and liberalisation of the country – such as lowering the threshold that parties need to overcome to enter parliament from the current 10 per cent or modernising the rules for party financing – have been neglected.
The initial pro-EU reform drive was bipartisan in nature. The opposition parties supported the most important reforms, including various constitutional amendments. However, once the EU accession process flagged and the AKP’s own commitment weakened, the opposition adopted a more confrontational stance on EU-related issues.
However, it would be wrong to describe the situation in Turkey as one where a pro-EU AKP faces a eurosceptic opposition. The main opposition’s anti-EU rhetoric is a tactical tool, rather than the product of deeply held beliefs. The CHP, for example, was the first Turkish political party to have opened a representative office in Brussels. Other opposition parties have sought to join the party political families represented in the European Parliament. The CHP elected a new leader in May 2010, whom many people regard as more liberal and open-minded than his predecessor. It remains to be seen whether Kemal Kilicdaroglu will bring his party back towards a more EU-friendly stance.
Moreover, at the grassroots level, the split on EUrelated topics is much less pronounced than among the party leaderships. Many AKP supporters, as well as those voting for centre-left parties and many members of the Kurdish minority, continue to support EU accession. Only far-right nationalists, both at the political and the grassroots level, staunchly oppose EU membership. Therefore, there is hope that if and when Turkey’s current political polarisation is reversed, support for EU-linked reforms can quickly be rekindled across the political spectrum.
