What the EU’s role should be in supporting democratic transition in Tunisia was the central theme of three EUISS Brussels-based events held on 1-2 February. These consisted of the launch of a new Chaillot Paper on the Middle East, which was well attended by the international media, a workshop bringing together EU officials and experts from Tunisia, Morocco and Europe, and finally a breakfast debate with PSC ambassadors. The main purpose of all three events was to gain a better understanding of the main challenges to a successful democratic transformation in Tunisia, and to clarify what issues the international community, and notably the EU, should be addressing as a matter of priority in order to help ensure that genuine democracy is the final outcome.
Main conclusions
1. The future of the democratic process remains undecided. Although all felt confident that turning back the clock to autocratic one-man rule was no longer possible, a genuinely democratic outcome can still be derailed by attempts at restoring the old order which could result in the emergence of a ‘liberal authoritarian’regime.
2. The final outcome of the transition, just like the uprising that has led to it, lies in the hands of the Tunisians. There is much that outside powers can do to help the transition succeed in achieving the desired democratic outcome, but there is also much they can do to hamper it, particularly if fear of change persists among Western governments.
3. Tunisia has very close ties with the EU and – unlike in Egypt– the EU’s attitude to political transformation there has a significant impact as far as elites are concerned. The fear of change which still exists among Tunisian elites echoes the EU’s perceived insistence on stability and its view that political forces with Islamist leanings should be marginalised. It was suggested that keeping Mohammed Ghanouchi as prime minister and the preserving the existing constitution drafted under Ben Ali, under the modified provisions of which presidential elections will be held within a relatively very short timeframe, was partly a response designed to allay international anxieties and put European leaders firmly on the side of transition.
Main challenges
The main challenges that need to be met in order to ensure the democratic outcome of political transition in Tunisia can be summarised as follows : 1. The potential for destabilisation and violence deriving from disruptive forces that are both overtly and covertly opposing democratic transition. These include former and current members of the ex-ruling party, the RCD (currently suspended by the prime minister and possibly on the verge of being dissolved), elements among the security forces (whose potential for disruption has been contained but not neutralized by being in effect placed under military control) and the militias linked to both of the above.
2. Attempts at destabilisation mainly through support provided to undemocratic forces inside Tunisia that may possibly emanate from neighbouring countries interested in seeing Tunisia’s experiment with democracy fail.
3. The weakness of pro-democracy political parties, and also the weakness of the media (in this regard the total absence of a free press under Ben Ali has left a negative legacy).
4. The grave socio-economic situation in Tunisia, where unemployment stands at around 15%, purchasing power has dramatically declined largely as a result of rising food prices (around 50% over the last ten years), large swathes of the agricultural and industrial sector are severely depressed, the lack of basic infrastructure is appalling, and some 100,000 graduates are currently unable to find decent jobs.
5. The immediate economic impact of the crisis, acutely felt in the tourist industry, for which the figure is thought to stand close to $US 2 billion.
Main recommendations to the EU
1. To deal with the socio-economic situation as a matter of priority : this should include calling for an international donors’ conference to support Tunisia in addressing the heavily depressed interior regions, and assisting in easing the immediate economic impact of the uprising.
2. To urgently adapt the instruments and facilities at its disposal under the Neighbourhood Policy to the specific demands of supporting democratic transformation, and to speedily move from Tunisia’s ill-defined ‘advanced status’ process to starting a new generation of association agreements.
3. To engage in a comprehensive dialogue (through the appropriate channels, involving EU and national institutions as well as NGOs) that should target the following interlocutors : the government, the judiciary and other institutions ; political movements and parties ; labour organisations such as the UGTT ; and professional and civil society associations that have played a major role in the ruling regime’s demise.
Tunisia’s civil society has amply demonstrated its vitality in recent months. It should continue to play a major role in ensuring a successful transition and shaping Tunisia’s democratic future, and the EU should stand ready to lend meaningful support and step up people-to-people exchanges.
4. To refrain from any kind of interference in the internal political sphere, in particular in trying to determine or prejudge which political forces are eligible for participation in the political process and which are not. This relates specifically to the Islamic party Ennahdha which was banned under the former regime. There must be a clear distinction between groups which have not renounced violence and those who are willing to abide by the rules of due political process, reflecting a distinction that applies in Europe itself. The prodemocracy movement that has begun in Tunisia and now spread to Egypt requires the EU to strongly invest in a better understanding of the role of civil society and political Islam in the Arab world.
5. To make available EU ‘know-how’ on democratic transition so that Tunisia can benefit from the positive (and negative) aspects of previous experiences. These recommendations were addressed to the European Union in the wider sense, i.e. not merely to Brussels-based EU institutions but also to the capitals, civil societies and think tanks of EU Member States. The EUISS, for example, is co-organising a seminar in Tunis (9-10 March) on the transitions to democracy that have taken place in Southern and Central Europe. It was pointed out, furthermore, that European foundations can play an important role in supporting political parties in Tunisia – a crucial component of a successful transition – following the example of the German party foundations’ support to the democratic transitions in Portugal and Spain.
