Europe is not doing enough in Afghanistan. Although they frequently talk about the importance of non-military instruments, many European governments have failed to provide staff to civilian bodies like EUPOL (which advises and trains the Afghan National Police), the office of the EU special representative to Afghanistan, or the NATO civilian representative’s office. And while many European governments have pushed for the UN to take on a stronger role in policy development and coordination, few have given the UN mission in Afghanistan and Kai Eide, the Norwegian diplomat who serves as the special representative of the UN secretary general, the necessary support, staff or resources, either in New York or Kabul. Despite the decision last year to bulk up the EUPOL mission to 400 people, actual staffing levels remain at less than half this figure, with many European countries having no personnel in the mission at all. Some medium-sized EU Member States, like Austria, Belgium and Portugal, do not even have an accredited resident ambassador in Kabul, an extraordinary situation that undercuts their governments’ proclamations of support for non-military policies.
But more importantly, for a bloc that wants to be taken seriously as a partner to the US, the EU’s Afghanistan strategy and, more broadly, its approach to the entire region are floundering. They may have spent billions of euros in reconstruction and contributed almost as many troops as the US to the NATO mission, but European governments have failed to agree on an EU strategy with clear ideas of what they want to see happen.
There are a number of ways Europe can make a difference in Afghanistan, aside from simply sending more troops. Although Member States have made different levels of commitment to the Afghan mission, European leaders seem to agree implicitly on what is needed : the opening of negotiations with “reconcilable” Taliban insurgents, more civilian reconstruction, a development-based approach to counter-narcotics, more training for the Afghan security forces to enable them to lead the counter-insurgency effort, and regional initiatives that include not only Pakistan but also India, Iran and China.
Such efforts could complement the coming US military surge and replicate the success of General Petraeus’s strategy in Iraq, where a military surge and an increase in civilian personnel were coordinated with the opening of negotiations with insurgency groups. Contrary to widespread perception, in Iraq, the military surge played “at best a kind of supporting role in case something went wrong”, as Michael von der Schulenburg, a UN diplomat who has worked both in Baghdad and Kabul, puts it.
Since most European governments acknowledge the success of the surge in Iraq, the challenge in forging a common EU strategy seems to be practical rather than philosophical. If EU leaders want to influence US policy – rather than simply choose whether to implement or obstruct it – they need to define what they want and what they are willing to offer. Although the US will retain its policy primacy, particularly after its increase in troop numbers, the Obama administration will want to hear European ideas. Yet other than the “reflection paper” drafted by France last year, which articulated policy ideas on a number of regional issues, the EU does not have a strategy for either Afghanistan or for Pakistan. Nor is anyone empowered to articulate European views either at the political or bureaucratic level. This needs to change.
(...) The EU has increased its efforts in Afghanistan over the last couple of years, with a veritable surge of troops and a rise in development funding. However, it does not have a coherent strategy, and as a result is doing less than it could and a lot less than the situation merits. Few European governments have deployed civilians into the UN Afghan mission or EUPOL, despite their repeated insistences that the Afghan mission needs to be “civilianised”. EU development assistance to Afghanistan may be increasing, but it still represents a small percentage of overall EU development aid.
Few countries make Afghanistan a real priority, and aid flows do not take into account regional differences. Moreover, a considerable proportion of pledged aid never reaches the intended recipients. The EU’s dealings with Pakistan have been technical and limited, despite the strategic importance of shoring up the Pakistani government, and despite the leverage that the EU has as Pakistan’s largest trading partner.
The EU is, in fact, well placed to strengthen its role in many of the key areas that require a renewed effort in Afghanistan and Pakistan, such as policing assistance, political outreach and regional confidence-building. Developing the details of a new EU strategy will not be easy. Each Member State and each EU institution already has its own plans and is primed to argue that it is doing enough. Nevertheless, European leaders could agree to draft a reflection paper like the one authored last year by the French EU presidency. They could then ask the EU special representative in Kabul, Ettore Sequi, to bring together stakeholders, including the European Council Secretariat, the European Commission, EUPOL , NATO and European governments, to examine what Europe could do better, much as Wolfgang Ischinger did on behalf of the EU in Kosovo. Such a process would also allow European governments to engage with the US on Afghan/Pakistani policy. The EUSR’s office needs to become a fully fledged, well-staffed organisation that can bring together the work undertaken by the EC delegation and the ESDP mission.
Once Europe has agreed a new policy with the US, it should pull together its transatlantic strategy and its own new initiatives in a new EU Afghanistan strategy, owned jointly by the Council Secretariat and the European Commission, which would be sent out for discussion in European parliaments and agreed by European leaders before a US-EU meeting. It is in Europe’s interests to help rebuild an insurgency-free Afghanistan and a stable Pakistan. Europe now needs to match those interests with its resources, attention and long-term commitment.
