Impasse à Nicosie

Après les élections présidentielles à Chypre du Nord qui a donné la victoire au candidat « nationaliste » Devis Eroglu sur le président sortant Mehmet Ali Talat (centre-gauche), les perspectives de réunification de l’île s’éloignent un peu plus. Professeur à l’université Bigli d’Istanbul, Soli Özel propose la tenue d’une conférence de type Dayton, sous l’égide de l’Union européenne et des Nations unies, pour tenter de sortir de l’impasse. Ce texte a été publié sur le site du German Marshall Fund. http://www.gmfus.org/publications/article.cfm?id=916

On April 18, the voters in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) elected their new president. They voted for the old nationalist hand, Prime Minister Derviş Eroğlu, over their current president, left-of-center Mehmet Ali Talat. Talat devoted his entire political career to a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus conflict ; his loss should trouble all those who seek a reso­lution for the long-simmering problem

Eroğlu, better known for his passionate commitment to a non-solution, promised to continue with the negotiations process. These negotiations are being conducted with the president of the Republic of Cy­prus (Turkey does not recognize Cyprus and calls it the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus).

A breakdown of the vote shows that Eroğlu drew his support overwhelmingly from those constituencies that have a higher proportion of migrants (settlers) from mainland Turkey. Most Turkish Cypriots, who may by now have become a minority on their own island due both to immigration and emigration, supported Talat. But even in their case, the lack of enthusiasm for the process of negotiations and the sense of betrayal and abandonment by the European Union and the international community at large were tangible.

After all, Turkish Cypriots overwhelm­ingly supported the UN and EU sanctioned Annan Plan in 2004 and voted in favor of it in a referendum held simultaneously on both parts of the island on April 24. They did so with the expec­tation that their long-standing isolation from the world order would finally end if unification in a federated state were achieved. In this, they benefited from the advent to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey that changed the country’s long-standing policy of stonewalling on negotiations. Such a stance broke the grip of hardline nationalists on the political destiny of the island’s Turkish population.

The Annan Plan, named after the then- UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, was a meticulously prepared document that took into account the accumulated wisdom and experience of the past 30 years. Its ground rules were such that the Secretary General would fill in the blanks if the two sides did not agree on a particu­lar matter. The negotiating sides could not object to the final version as drafted by the Secretary General.

The Greek government of the day remained aloof in the final stages and the Greek Cypriot government, led by hardliner Tassos Papadopoulos, re­neged on its commitments and active­ly campaigned for a “no” vote as did current Cypriot President Demetris Christophias. The result was a resounding “no” vote on the Greek Cypriot side effectively voting for partition unless further negotiations and an agreement undid the damage. In the words of the then commissioner for enlargement, Gunther Verheugen, “The EU is cheated by the Greek Cypriots.”

The Turkish Cypriots and Turkey then expected the long-iso­lated northern part of the island to be rewarded for its support of the Annan Plan. They were in for a great disappointment. Only a week after the referendum, the Greek Cypriots were admitted into the European Union. One of the first actions of the Nicosia government as member of the European Union was to block the right for the Turkish Cypriots to trade directly with EU member states.

In its turn, Turkey dragged its feet in extending the Ankara pro­tocol to the Republic of Cyprus and refused to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot vessels unless the restrictions against the Turkish Cypriots and their international isolation were lifted. Similarly, Ankara asked that the EU trade directly with the north and for good measure allow air traffic to the airports of the north as well. The refusal of Ankara to open its sea ports and airports led to the suspension of eight articles in the EU negotiation process in 2006. In 2009, Cyprus declared its intention to block negotiations on six additional chapters effectively bringing the number of blocked chapters to 14.

Thus, the irresolution of the Cyprus imbroglio effectively means slow death for Turkey’s EU membership aspirations. Greek Cyprus uses every opportunity to block Turkey’s ac­cession process and any move on the part of its partners that might be considered as recognition of the TRNC. Some member states hide behind Cyprus as well in order to keep the membership process in the deep coma where it currently is.

What next

Undoubtedly the election of Eroğlu means a victory for the hardliners both on the island and in Turkey. In the words of journalist Erdal Güven, Talat became the latest victim of the “irresolution” of the conflict. His departure signifies a new era that is full of uncertainties and one in which the hands-off ap­proach of the international community and the lethargy of the European Union will be increasingly counterproductive.

Whatever his private views, Eroğlu will have to work with the hand that he is dealt. This means, given the north’s de­pendence on Turkey, he will have to remain within the pa­rameters set for him by the government in Turkey. Ankara underwrites the TRNC to the tune of about $700 million a year. He already declared his intention to continue with the negotiation process that began in 2008.

Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan already took a position and declared his preference for the continuation of the negotiating process. Turkey’s position is one of seeking a solution, he said, reiterating his expectation that the change of guard in the presidency would not alter the course of Turk­ish Cypriot politics. There is little doubt Erdoğan means what he says and even less doubt that the president of TRNC is likely to heed the call of the Turkish Prime Minister.

Looking ahead, I would like to make the following assess­ment. The pro-EU, liberally-minded Turkish public is as disillusioned with the European Union on the issue of Cyprus as the Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, any call on the public to put pressure on its government to move ahead with opening sea ports and airports to Greek Cypriot vessels would fall on deaf ears.

Without a gesture from the European Union, whether it be the lifting of the trade embargo or a grander gesture such as starting direct flights to Ercan Airport in the north, the Turkish government is unlikely to move. The fact that the ac­cession negotiations may be coming to a halt—there are only a handful of chapters left that can be opened as a result of suspensions and vetoes—will not change the equation.

The worst possible outcome would be a breakdown in the negotiation process that would lead to a de facto partition of the island. If the Greek Cypriots were to walk out on the talks, then the Turkish government would use all its resources to get some friendly countries to recognize TRNC, close to impossible though this may sound today. Such a development would also facilitate a de facto process of unification of the north with Turkey, and will guarantee the further shrink­ing of the Turkish Cypriot population relative to the settler population from Turkey. Alternatively, scenarios such as the Taiwanization or Kosovoization of the north would present themselves on the agenda.

Such scenarios are currently highly unlikely. The Turk­ish government is expected to continue with its policy of presenting the negotiation process as a win-win arrange­ment. Ankara will make every effort to remain a step ahead of the game. Eroğlu will not leave the negotiating table. Yet, neither the Turkish Cypriots nor Ankara’s efforts alone will suffice to move the process forward.

Most observers agree that Christophias has been less than help­ful to his long-time friend and political comrade on the left, Talat. He is now left to deal with Eroğlu. In the negotiations, since Christophias got elected, there was agreement on 22 confidence-building measures but very few were implemented. As Christophias constantly had to look over his shoulder and appease his more hardline supporters, the Turkish Cypriot public lost faith in the ability of Talat to lead them to a success­ful resolution. They even lost faith in the process itself as the election results indicate.

Objectively speaking there is really very little to add to the Annan plan which, despite its flaws and the potential difficul­ties in implementing it, offered the best chance for a solution. The next move should be to rename the plan while keeping its principles and most of its mechanisms in place. Although nobody feels any pressure for a deadline, the end of 2010 is actually a critical threshold. In 2011, Turkey will have entered its electoral campaign season and Erdoğan will be under pressure from nationalist forces for his Cyprus policies as well. Then, at the beginning of 2012, the Greek Cypriots will have their election, usually not a good season for peace seek­ing in the South.

The window of opportunity is narrow. Missing this final chance will likely stall the process. Such an eventuality will further deteriorate Turkey-EU relations. Not to mention the blockage that Cyprus presents for EU-NATO relations and European security architecture in general.

Therefore it is high time for a paralyzed, ineffectual and unimaginative European Union and the equally lethargic UN to internationalize the negotiating process and bring all the relevant parties to a Dayton style conference. The leadership for such an initiative can come from the United States as well. Although Washington has its hands full in Iraq, AfPAk, Iran, and elsewhere, tipping the scales in favor of a settle­ment in what is an overripe situation would be worth the trouble.