In the upcoming weeks and months, all observers of the Turkish political scene will have a lot to get used to : Fitful though it may be, the country’s political modernization is running apace and a new political architecture is being formed.
The recent television images of 49 retired and active duty officers (two force commanders and a deputy chief of staff among them) being removed from their homes by the police and taken into custody were quite a shock. Many of the detainees were arrested and will await trial possibly on charges of conspiring to overthrow the Turkish government in 2003 as part of an alleged plan named “Sledgehammer.”
The immediate reaction abroad was one of apprehension about the military’s possible retaliation. When all the generals and admirals of the Turkish military met the evening of the arrests, the level of anxiety only escalated. In the end, nothing much happened—a different story from other times, when the military called all the shots.
Until recently, almost no analysis of Turkish politics could be complete without a word or two on its politically powerful (meddlesome ?) military. Indeed, the military has exerted enormous influence in Turkish politics over the decades, since it was the foundational institution of the Republican regime.
Since 1960, it has been actively engaged in politics almost incessantly through military takeovers, attempted coups, “post-modern” interventions, and a myriad other means. Turkey’s current constitution was written by and for the military, and its authoritarian spirit is still dominant despite tens of amendments enacted as part of the EU reform process.
For those accustomed to seeing the military in such an all-powerful position, the recent developments have been quite shocking. Here was an institution defending its political role, as its power receded. Civilianization of the polity deepened. There is no significant constituency for military rule domestically, and the international environment is not one that could accept the legitimacy of such a move.
The weakening of the staunchly secularist military’s grip on the country’s politics started about a decade ago. Institutional dynamics, the profound transformation of Turkish society, the advent to power of a party with an Islamist pedigree for which civilianization was an existential matter all contributed to this trend. Turkey’s EU accession process provided the framework for and further inducement to the continuation of the civilianization/democratization process.
The unraveling began with an investigation that started after the discovery of arms caches in the garden of an officer. The so-called Ergenekon investigation, which launched in 2007, looked into different conspiracies and the illicit activities of a network of military and civilian personalities—retired officers, including four-star generals, were arrested along with their alleged co-conspirators. The investigation exposed part of the military and their civilian collaborators as subversive of the constitutional order.
The critical element here is that the current military top brass was at least tacitly supportive of the investigation and the arrests in order to cleanse the institution from such elements.
Three years ago, the weekly magazine Nokta published the diaries of a former Navy commander. These told the story of coup plots by force commanders in 2003 and 2004 that went awry. In the first case, the chief of staff was able to block these efforts. In the second case, the commander of the gendarmerie had no supporters among the top brass.
Later on, a succession of leaked documents revealed many more plans that aimed to generate instability, create conditions for a military intervention through acts of terror, and overthrow the government.
The leaks did substantial damage to the military’s reputation on at least two counts. First, the appearance that almost every conversation was eavesdropped, and that top secret documents were obtained and exposed in public indicated a serious security breach in the heart of the Turkish military.
Second, the outrageous plans that were alleged to have been prepared within the corpse, the discovery of arms caches in different parts of the country suggested a military where some factions were clearly out of control. The inability of armed forces chief General Basbug to come up with convincing explanations about these revelations—and his apparent lack of knowledge about what his subordinates had done—undermined his own prestige.
As the investigation unfolded, many opinion leaders who initially supported it and its auxiliary operations began to raise concerns about the procedural problems that plagued the case. Islamic fraternities that are well organized within the police and have some influence in the judiciary were thought to have their own insidious agenda for gaining power. Accusations of political revanchism abounded. Concerns about the politicization of the judiciary were frequently expressed. In fact the judiciary, which has always been politicized and never really independent or impartial, was itself sharply split between pro-government and anti-government factions. Neither of these appeared to care much for the rule of law.
What is happening in Turkey is a transformation of the old order and a radical shift in the balance of power from the military towards the civilians. The military, until recently, provided the backbone for the Turkish political system, and it was the custodian of the existing order as well as the provider of its ideology. Urban middle classes for far too long relied on the military to fight their secularist battles for them and abdicated their responsibilities.
These days are over and the Turkish political system needs a new institutional arrangement and a new ideological framework. The fierceness of the battle reflects the magnitude of the stakes and the increasing mobilization of the civilian forces. This is no less than a battle for the soul and the identity of a new Turkish republic.
Turkey passed an important threshold in the great power shift from the military to civilian authorities that started at the beginning of the decade. Whether this deepening civilianization will lead, as expected, to a rule-based democratic consolidation and finally finish the “second transition” from democratic government to democratic regime remains to be seen.
